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 Introduction
 “Ring -3” Execution Environment
 Our “Ring -3” Rootkit
 Target Platform Infiltration
 Exfiltration of Collected Data
 Summary
 Future Work





–     ring 3  (user space)
→ ring 0  (kernel space) 
→ “ring -1” (hypervisor/VMM)
→ “ring -2” (System Management Mode)
→ “ring -3” (Intel Active Management 
                Technology)
 No ring -3 in hardware → “ring -3”
 Illustration: following the x86 ring protection model
 “Ring -3” rootkits related to modern x86 platforms
Memory Controller Hub, Serial Peripheral Interface Chip,
“A Quest to Ring -3“ (cf. [Ter09])
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Manageability
Engine
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“Ring -3” Execution Environment (2/2)
 Isolated execution environment implemented using an 
embedded µController





 Still working when platform powered down
 Active when turned off in BIOS
 More powerful than hypervisor or system management mode 
(SMM) based rootkits
 Actually intended for active platform management 
(cf. [Kum09])
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Our “Ring -3” Rootkit (1/3)
 USB Keystroke Logger for Linux operating system
– Finds keyboard buffer
– Monitors keyboard buffer constantly in background




























Keystroke Logger executed in Isolated Execution Environment
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Our “Ring -3” Rootkit (2/3)





















 Computer forensic (find USB keyboard buffer)
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Our “Ring -3” Rootkit (3/3)
 Why not evaluating “ring -3” rootkit provided by [Ter09] ?
[Ter09] POC USB Keylogger
Prototype
[Ter09] POC Rootkit compared to our USB Keylogger Prototype
Reveals itself
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Target Platform Infiltration
 No Intel developer board providing
“ring -3” (and JTAG support, cf. [Bul08])
Board Features (cf. [Int07], p.11)
ITP-XDP Connector location (J2BC)
(cf. [Int07], p.20)
Let's Program DMA Manually (cf. [Bul08], p.13)
We use exploit discovered by [Ter09]
(cf. last slide)
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Exfiltration of Collected Data
 Data collected by USB Keystroke Logger placed in a network 
packet
– In our case DHCP discover
– Sent via iAMT's OOB communication (invisible for host)
Logged bytes from
keyboard buffer
0x04: character 'a'0x02: left shift key
Captured Network Packet containing
Bytes from Keyboard Buffer
Keystroke Logger Demo:
Online Banking Sign On
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Important Related Work
 [Bul08] Y. Bulygin: Chipset based Approach to detect Virtualization Malware. 
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Summary
 Stealth USB Keystroke Logger
– Isolated from host environment → AV software unable to 
find keystroke logger
 Monitors Linux OS (currently ported to Windows OS)
– Finds keyboard buffer
– Collects keystroke codes
– Exfiltrates keystroke codes via isolated network channel
 Current prototype can be detect using second platform
– See future work ...
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Future Work
 Detection Mechanism for Host Platform
– [Ter09] discussed countermeasures, but
• Also provide approaches to defeat 
countermeasures (cf. virtual CDROM)
– First detection approaches:
• Provoke deleays when accessing same resources:
– Memory ?
– Network ?
– Bus Master ?
 Evaluate Windows version of our keystroke logger
 Implementation of covert timing channel (e.g., JitterBug)
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Thank you!
Questions?
